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Cry "havoc," and let slip the dogs of war.1
I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of May 2, 1992, Marvin Rivas tried for the second
time to drive his battered Datsun through a United States Army road-
block. 2 The soldiers stationed at the roadblock were members of the Cal-
ifornia Army National Guard's 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
and they had been on the streets of Los Angeles since rioting began four
days earlier.3 California Governor Pete Wilson had called the troops
from their civilian4 lives to active duty just hours after the Rodney King
verdict had sparked widespread chaos throughout the city.'
The soldiers were manning their blockade in the Pico-Union dis-
trict, an area in which the rioting had been particularly severe.6 Rivas
drove rapidly toward the nervous troops, ignoring their orders to stop
and forcing one soldier to leap out of the path of the speeding car.
Three soldiers locked and loaded' their M16A1 assault rifles, took aim
and fired.9 Rivas was hit in the head and arm."° The mortician who
prepared Rivas's body for the open-casket funeral placed a baseball cap
on his head to cover the bullets' damage."I
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 1.
2. Paul Feldman, Faces ofDeath: 10 Men Slain by Officers in Riots, L.A. TIMES, May 24,
1992, at Al, A25. Unknown to the soldiers, Rivas was an immigrant from El Salvador who
was reputed to be a drug dealer in the Pico-Union area. Id. One witness described Rivas as
having participated in acts of looting earlier in the riots. Id.
3. Greg Seigle, Civil Wars Police Praise Guard's L.A. Performance, ARMY TIMES, May
18, 1992, at 12.
4. This Comment uses the term "civilian" to describe all persons or institutions not under
military control. For example, a police officer would be considered a civilian.
5. See Seigle, supra note 3.
6. See Feldman, supra note 2.
7. Id
8. "Locked and loaded" is a slang term used by soldiers to describe a weapon that has a
magazine locked in place and a bullet loaded in the chamber. A locked and loaded weapon is
ready to fire.
9. See Feldman, supra note 2, at A25.
10. See Tracy Wilkinson, In Pico-Union, Refugees Land in a New War Zone, L.A. TIMES,
May 11, 1992, at Al, A12.
11. See Feldman, supra note 2.
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If the shooting had taken place in a combat zone there would have
been little comment, perhaps only a routine report to the soldiers' higher
headquarters. But this took place in an American city, and though it was
not wartime, the United States' military was engaged in combat opera-
tions on the streets of Los Angeles. 2
The deployment of military forces in Los Angeles is a recent exam-
ple of the growing willingness of political leaders to commit military
forces to "civilian support missions"13 within the borders of the United
States. This change comes as some commentators put forth the view that
the downfall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the communist
bloc have left the United States with a massive military structure and
only limited defense interests overseas. 4 At the same time, the Ameri-
can people have renewed confidence in their military because of its su-
perb performance in the Gulf War. 5 This has led prominent Americans
to encourage the use of the military to solve intractable domestic
problems 1 6 Some look at the military as an example of, and potential
engine for, social change.1 7 Others see the military's unparalleled organi-
zational, logistical and human resources as ideal tools with which to re-
spond to natural disasters. 8 Together, these views raise the specter of a
greatly increased role for the military within civilian society.
12. See infra part III.C.3.
13. When used in this Comment, the term "civilian support missions" refers to any opera-
tions in which armed military forces operate in conjunction with civilian organizations to real-
ize a goal traditionally understood to be within the province of civilian law enforcement
agencies. These missions include involvement in anti-drug operations (such as smuggling in-
terdiction efforts), control of the nation's borders, and maintaining order in cities and disaster
areas. See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
14. Jeff Greenfield, Rethinking the Formula, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, at MI; Jed C.
Snyder, Must the U.S. Disengage?, NAT'L REv., Nov. 16, 1992, at 29; see also Laureen
Lazarovici, Di Flies, Barbara Plummets, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct. 23, 1992, at 28 (detailing Senate
candidate Diane Feinstein's advocacy of domestic use of military); Soraya S. Nelson & Jim
Wolffe, New Military Mission Could Surface in Andrew's Wake, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at
17 (describing policy debate on role of military).
15. Thomas Ferraro, One Year After Iraqi Invasion, UPI, Aug. 2, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (finding that majority of American citizens have high level of
confidence in military).
16. See Greenfield, supra note 14; Melissa Healy & Sheryl Stolberg, Hurricane Relief
Blows Winds of Change for Military, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A24; Nelson & Wolffe,
supra note 14; Thomas E. Ricks, Colonel Dunlap's Coup, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1993, at 23; see
also Lazarovici, supra note 14 (describing politician's support for domestic use of military).
17. See Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment, Analyzing the Military's Justifications for Its Ex-
clusionary Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 151, 211 (1992)
(arguing that inclusion of lesbians and gays in military would benefit nation); Melissa Healy,
New Set of Marching Orders, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at Al (discussing strengthening mili-
tary-civilian connections).
18. See Nelson & Wolffe, supra note 14.
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While the military has earned respect for its actions in foreign
wars, 9 the Founders of the United States20 as well as the English in pre-
vious centuries' were horrified by the idea of using the military within
civil society. Unlike the politicians of today, the Founders and their
English ancestors recognized that the military must remain outside of
civilian society.
Controlling civil disturbances, as in Los Angeles, is but one domes-
tic role the military has played in recent years.22 Armed military forces
also have provided security and logistical assistance during natural disas-
ters such as Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana in 1992,23 and
have assisted with drug interdiction24 and immigration control by patrol-
ling U.S. borders. 25 At times, the military has even provided added fire-
power to outgunned law enforcement officers.26
Explaining why the military should stand aside as problems grow
out of control would make a poor sound bite for a politician. Allowing
19. Id.
20. See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Mili-
tary Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IowA L. REv. 1, 18-31 (1971).
21. Id. at 2-18.
22. Authorities continue to plan for the use of military forces in civil disturbance opera-
tions. See Carla Rivera, National Guard Stages Show of Riot Readiness, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1993, at Al, A3.
23. See Greg Seigle, To the Rescue: Army Provides Comfort to Hurricane Victims, ARMY
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 16.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3 (1986) (describing legislation
enabling military to provide greater support to drug interdiction efforts); see also Greg Seigle,
California Vice: National Guard Unit Fights the Drug War from the Front Lines, ARMY
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 11 (describing California Army National Guard operations against
drug smugglers); U.S. Agents Arrest 10, Seize Ton of Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at
A13 (discussing use of military aircraft to track drug planes).
25. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, U.S. Military Will Shelter Haitians at Base in Cuba, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1991, at Al (describing mobilization of troops to run camp for Haitian refu-
gees caught by Coast Guard during attempted illegal entry into United States); John H. Lee,
Bank of Lights Planned to Deter Border Activity, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at Al (discussing
Army plan to build floodlights to deter illegal border crossing); Lee Romney, U.S. Erects Last
Strip of Border Fence, L.A. TIMES (San Diego County ed.), Aug. 15, 1992, at B1 (describing
ten-foot fence built by Army reservists along U.S.-Mexican border); cf. Lazarovici, supra note
14 (discussing Senate candidate Dianne Feinstein's support for using military forces to patrol
U.S.-Mexican border); Larry Speer, Gallegly Advocates Troops at Borders, L.A. TIMES (Valley
ed.), June 19, 1992, at B2 (discussing Representative Elton Gallegly's request for 10,000 troops
to patrol border); Tracey Wilkinson, Candidates Tough on Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1992, at A3 (discussing Feinstein's support for using military forces to patrol border).
26. See Stephen Braun & Richard A. Serrano, Siege Continues at Texas Cult Site, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al, A14. The military supplied Bradley armored personnel carriers to
federal agents surrounding a fortified cult headquarters in Waco, Texas, Id. Later, federal
authorities brought in MI Abrams tanks after the cult leader threatened to destroy the
Bradleys. Louis Sahagun, 'Ready for War,' Defiant Leader of Cult Tells FBI, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1993, at Al.
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the Air Force to track drug smuggling aircraft seems a small violation of
tradition.17 Letting the Navy house Haitian immigrants28 seems like a
practical use for bases that are standing idle. Using Army soldiers to
patrol the border with Mexico appeals to some as a simple solution to the
complex problem of illegal immigration, especially in election years.29
When natural disaster strikes, leaving support troops on their bases when
they could be providing assistance to fellow Americans seems unreasona-
ble. Such benign success stories inevitably lead to calls for greater
intervention.
However, these are the first steps down a dangerous path. Unlike
civilian society, with its democratic claim to legitimacy and its emphasis
on individual rights and procedural justice, the military was, and is, a
unique institution that achieves its goals through the use and threat of
force.3" It should not be surprising that when the military is ordered to
act in the civilian arena it is ill-prepared to respond.3
The military is designed, organized and equipped to effect the rapid,
violent and efficient destruction of the "enemy," whoever that may be.32
Military methods are not designed to handle the shades of gray that a
police officer encounters on the beat, but are tailored to the stark black
and white of a battlefield. Still, the troops are expected to efficiently and
forcefully accomplish their mission while operating within the con-
straints of civilian society.33
Civilian law expects troops to conform their behavior to the dictates
of terms of art that do not exist in a military vocabulary. For example,
troops must assess whether the use of force is "reasonable ' 34 and avoid
27. See U.S. Agents Arrest 10, Seize Ton of Cocaine, supra note 24.
28. See Healy, supra note 25.
29. See Lazarovici, supra note 14; Wilkinson, supra note 25; see also Speer, supra note 25
(discussing Representative Elton Gallegly's request for 10,000 troops to patrol border).
30. "The overriding mission of US forces is to deter war. The US Army supports that
mission by providing combat ready units to the unified and specified commands which are
charged with executing the military policies of the United States and waging war should deter-
rence fail." U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5: OPERATIONS I (May 5, 1986).
31. See infra parts III-IV.
32. See U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-10: THE INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY 1-1 (Dec.
14, 1990) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 7-10] (explaining that Army mission is to kill enemy
soldiers, destroy enemy equipment and shatter enemy's will to resist).
33. Cf Greg Seigle, Troops Take Crash Course in Riot Control, ARMY TIMES, May 18,
1992, at 16 (describing how heavily armed soldiers were deployed in Los Angeles with orders
to end rioting).
34. See, eg., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1985) (requiring peace officers to
apply test to determine if shooting fleeing suspect is justifiable).
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violating the "civil rights' '35 of civilians who the military forces, once
deployed on American streets, come to view as the enemy. Such a di-
chotomy invites confusion and tragedy.36
The use of troops in Los Angeles was a reminder that when military
forces are used in law enforcement operations there is always the possi-
bility that deadly force may be used.37 That concern is heightened by the
nature of the military's likely opponents. Rioters, drug smugglers and
looters are often armed and dangerous, and many individuals arrested in
civil disturbances have later been found to have criminal records. 38 But
potentially dangerous civilians are not the only ones the military will en-
counter. If soldiers become a common sight on the streets of America,
these issues will concern every American.
There have been instances in which the results of troop deployments
have been positive. In Los Angeles, some citizens in riot-torn areas
"smiled, waved and beeped their car horns at passing convoys of
soldiers." 9 However, in other instances the results have been tragic,
such as the infamous killing of four students at Kent State University by
soldiers of the Ohio National Guard in 1970.4 The purpose of this Com-
ment is to survey the issues that an increased domestic role for the mili-
tary raises and to provide a warning that the issue of the military's role
within civil society warrants careful consideration by those who seek to
expand that role.
35. Many cases involving allegations of the unjustified use of deadly force by state officials
are brought as federal civil actions to recover damages for the unlawful deprivation of the
plaintiff's civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see, ag., Garner, 471 U.S. at 12-13 (hold-
ing that police use of deadly force violated plaintiff's right to be free from unlawful seizure);
Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 572 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978) (alleg-
ing that National Guard's use of deadly force violated due process rights and right against
cruel and unusual punishment). Plaintiffs can also press "Bivens claims" against federal offi-
cials for civil rights violations. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
36. The effect that an expanded domestic role would have on the military, as an institu-
tion, is beyond the scope of this Comment. Consequently, though it is currently the subject of
great debate within military circles, the issue of the potentially damaging effects that an in-
creased emphasis on domestic roles would have on the military will not be considered here.
For discussions of this issue, see William Matthews, Critics Say Stay-At-Home Role Will Ham-
per Readiness, ARMY TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at 24; Ricks, supra note 16, at 23-25; Harry G.
Summers, Jr., Roots of the Coup of 2012 Lie in 1992, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at B7.
37. The author does not suggest that the shooting of Marvin Rivas by California Army
National Guard troops was in any way improper or unjustified.
38. See Sidney Fine, Rioters and Judges: The Response of the Criminal Justice System to
the Detroit Riot of 1967, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1723, 1723 (1987).
39. See Seigle, supra note 3, at 15.
40. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST 233-
410 (1970) [hereinafter CAMPUS UNREST] (describing Kent State shootings).
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This Comment begins by briefly exploring the tradition against the
use of the military within the domestic arena,41 describing how the train-
ing and equipment of the troops make them inappropriate for the civilian
support role.42 It next reviews the cases stemming from past civilian sup-
port missions and finds that the executive power to employ military
forces domestically presents extremely difficult problems for the judici-
ary." This Comment then explores the immunity privileges of the gov-
ernment, civilian officials and military personnel.' It concludes that the
balance the courts have struck between the necessity for freedom of ac-
tion and the protection of the citizenry benefits neither the troops nor the
civilian populace. Finally, this Comment recommends that the nation
resist the temptation to rely on the armed forces to solve its internal
problems.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT OF
MILITARY FORCES
A. The Tradition Against Domestic Use of the Military
The domestic use of military forces was a source of controversy long
before the first English colonist set foot on American soil. The history of
England includes frequent occasions of the King's subjects acting, some-
times violently, to limit royal power to employ the military internally.45
Much of colonial American history similarly revolves around this
issue. For example, a key incident leading to the American Revolution
was the Boston Massacre of 1770,46 in which English troops fired into an
unruly crowd and killed five American colonists.47 That tragedy helped
spark the revolution that began at Concord Bridge five years later.48 It
was there at Concord that armed American colonists first fought the
hated "Redcoats," British soldiers attempting to enforce the Crown's au-
thority over the civilian populace.49 The use of military forces by the
Crown was a key grievance cited by the Founders in the Declaration of
Independence."0
41. See infra part II.
42. See infra part III.
43. See infra part IV.
44. See infra part IV.
45. See Engdahl, supra note 20, at 2-18.
46. Id. at 24-25.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Speaking about the British monarch, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "He has affected to
render the Military independent of, and superior to the Civil Power." THE DECLARATION OF
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B. Limits on Domestic Use of the Military
The Founders of the United States experienced firsthand the poten-
tial uses of a standing army in the hands of a tyrant. In response, they
instead placed their faith in a militia drawn from the citizenry."1 Today,
the militia is defined by statute as "all able-bodied males at least 17 years
of age and.., under 45 years of age" who either are United States citi-
zens or intend to become citizens, as well as female commissioned officers
of the National Guard. 2 The organized branch of the militia is today's
National Guard."3 Along with the active duty forces of the Army and
the Marine Corps,14 the National Guard is the force most likely to come
in contact with American civilians because Air Force and Navy person-
nel generally conduct operations either in the air or at sea.
The Posse Comitatus Act regulates the use of federal military forces
in law enforcement.55 Congress passed the Act in response to the use of
federal soldiers for routine law enforcement in the occupied South during
the Reconstruction Era. 6 The Act made the use of federal troops in
routine law enforcement a crime punishable by two years in prison, a
$10,000 fine or both.1
7
The law does not prohibit all military action in support of civilian
law enforcement, but allows such uses "in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.""8 These
INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776); see also id. paras. 15, 24-26 (listing Colonists' grievances
against British Crown).
51. See Engdahl, supra note 20, at 18-27; THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
52. 10 U.S.C. § 31l(a) (1988).
53. Id § 311(b).
54. Active duty forces consist of personnel who perform "full-time duty in the active mili-
tary service of the United States." 10 U.S.C. § 101(22) (1988). Reserve forces, like the Na-
tional Guard, are composed of personnel who typically serve one weekend per month plus two
full weeks per year on active duty. See id. § 101(33); 32 U.S.C. § 270 (1988); id. § 502.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
56. James P. O'Shaugnhessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics Re-
considered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 704-10 (1976).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
58. Id.; see also Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances, 32
C.F.R. § 215.4 (1991) (setting guidelines for domestic use of military forces). There are two
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act based upon "the inherent right of the U.S. Government
... to insure the preservation of public order and the carrying out of governmental operations
within its territorial limits." Id. § 215.4(c)(1). These exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act
give the President the "emergency authority" to restore order and to protect federal functions
and property. Id. § 215.4(c)(1)(i)-(ii); see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (1988) (describing re-
quirements for President's domestic use of federal troops); H.R.J. Res. 1292, 82 Stat. 170
(1968), cited in 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2) (authorizing domestic use of troops for certain law
enforcement missions).
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situations include quelling insurrections59 as well as operations to ensure
federal laws are being enforced.6' In recent years, Congress has at-
tempted to force a generally unwilling Pentagon toward a more active
role in the fight against drugs,6 as well as an increased responsibility for
disaster relief operations.62
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to all military forces, how-
ever. The Coast Guard is not included under the Act,63 nor is the Na-
tional Guard when it is under state control.6" While the various state
National Guard forces are trained65 and regulated66 according to federal
standards,6 7 they remain under the command of the state governor who
may freely use them in law enforcement operations until federalized by
the President as authorized by statute.68 For example, the State of Cali-
fornia currently uses its National Guard forces in such a manner: "Task
Force Grizzly" operates surveillance positions along suspected drug
smuggling routes from Mexico, passing information on to civilian law
enforcement officials.69 Thus, the Posse Comitatus Act serves to limit,
but does not flatly prohibit, the use of military forces within the domestic
arena.
70
C. Instances of Domestic Use of Military Forces
In spite of the Founders' warnings and Congress's attempt to codify
those misgivings in the Posse Comitatus Act,71 throughout American
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id art. IV, § 4. There have been a number of occasions
when the military was called forth to battle insurrections. These include Shay's Rebellion
(from 1786 to 1787), the Whiskey Rebellion (in 1794), and the Dorr Rebellion (in 1842). See
Engdahl, supra note 20, at 49 nn.236-38 (listing occasions of domestic use of military forces).
From 1861 to 1865, the military, of course, also fought in the Nation's bloodiest conflict, the
American Civil War.
60. 10 U.S.C. § 332.
61. See Matthews, supra note 36.
62. See Nelson & Wolfe, supra note 14.
63. During peacetime, the Coast Guard is a part of the Department of Transportation. 14
U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Its commissioned officers are considered United States Customs Service
officers. Id. § 143 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1988).
64. See THE CITY IN CRISIS: A REPORT BY THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF
POLICE COMMISSIONERS ON THE CIVIL DISORDER IN Los ANGELES 152 (1992) [hereinafter
WEBSTER REPORT] (discussing status of California Army National Guard soldiers under
Posse Comitatus Act during Los Angeles Riots).
65. See 32 U.S.C. § 502 (setting training standards for National Guard personnel).
66. See id § 110 (giving President authority to regulate organization and discipline of
National Guard forces).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
68. 10 U.S.C. § 333.
69. See Seigle, supra note 24, at 10.
70. See supra note 58.
71. See supra part II.B.
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history, military forces have often been used to achieve domestic goals.
Some cases involved civil disturbances during peacetime,72 while others
occurred in the context of larger conflicts, such as the American Civil
War and World War II." Although the goals of civilian support opera-
tions vary, they share a common feature: The civilian government uses
military forces to perform functions the civilian government is unable to
successfully accomplish itself.
1. Domestic use of military forces during peacetime
Both federal troops and the military forces of the states-called to
active service by state governors-have been used in peacetime domestic
actions. In their capacity as commanders in chief, state governors have
often called out state military forces to quell violent civil disorder,74 but
litigation may result from the strong actions that the military forces take
to complete their missions. For example, in Moyer v. Peabody,75 a union
official unsuccessfully sought recovery from the former Governor of Col-
orado and officers of the Colorado National Guard.76 The Governor had
declared a county in the midst of a violent labor dispute "to be in a state
of insurrection."77 Soldiers had arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff
without charge, believing him an instigator of the violence.78
The call-up of the Pennsylvania National Guard that formed the
background of Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortal179 also re-
sulted from a violent strike.8 0 In Shortall, a soldier was charged with
killing a civilian while on sentry duty.8' The defendant soldier was
charged with the killing, but was released after the court found that the
homicide was justified by the martial rule in effect at the time.
8 2
In yet another instance of military forces operating in civil society,
the Governor of Texas called out his state's National Guard during what
72. See infra part II.C. 1. In the future, cases stemming from military disaster relief opera-
tions would fit within this category because military forces may be called upon to provide
armed security operations as they were in Florida and Louisiana following Hurricane Andrew
in August and September of 1992. See Seigle, supra note 23, at 16. Included would be such
activities as drug interdiction and border patrolling. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
73. See infra part II.C.2.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-86.
75. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
76. Id at 82-83, 86.
77. Id. at 82.
78. Id at 82-83.
79. 55 A. 952 (Pa. 1903).
80. Id. at 953.
81. Id.
82. Id at 957-58.
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he characterized an "insurrection" in the oil fields.8 3 He had his forces
seize the wells after declaring "martial law."8 However, the United
States Supreme Court found that the Governor's action-though not his
original declaration of a state of insurrection-was reviewable by federal
courts and upheld an injunction on Governor Sterling's actions.8 5 The
action of the Governor in the dispute over oil well production seemed to
stem more from expedience than any actual need to use military force.
86
2. Domestic use of military forces during wartime
During wartime and its immediate aftermath, the federal govern-
ment appears more willing to use the military internally than in peace-
time. For example, the plaintiff in Ex parte Milligan 7 was a civilian
arrested in Indiana by federal troops during the Civil War.88 Milligan
was tried by a military court martial and sentenced to hang as a Southern
sympathizer even though civilian courts were still functioning in the
area.89 The Court ordered Milligan's release.90
The Second World War and fear of actual invasion led to two cases
in which military forces operated domestically and in direct conflict with
the norms of civil society. During World War II, military authorities in
Hawaii tried civilians accused of purely civilian crimes until the Supreme
Court ended the practice by overturning the embezzlement conviction of
the defendant in Duncan v. Kahanamoku.9' However, the Court upheld
a military order excluding all those of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast in Korematsu v. United States.92
President Truman called the military into the domestic arena during
wartime, which led to the decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.93 In 1952, during the height of the Korean War, a frustrated
83. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 391 (1932).
84. See id. at 402-03. Martial law occurs when the processes and procedures of civil soci-
ety are suspended during a period of crisis and replaced by a system of governance by military
decree. See id.; Exparte MiUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118-31 (1866). The threat of danger to
the public justifies the executive's usurpation of judicial process. See Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S.
441, 446 (1878). However, civilian judicial process cannot be denied to civilians while civil
courts are open and functioning. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322-23 (1946); Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. at 127-29; Shortall, 55 A. at 954.
85. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 392-93.
86. Id. at 396-97.
87. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
88. Id. at 107-08.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 131.
91. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
92. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
93. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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President Truman ordered the military to seize steel mills shut down by a
labor dispute.94 The Supreme Court, however, found that the President
had no constitutional or statutory power to take such an action.95 Once
again, the executive tried to use the military to do what could not be
done otherwise.
III. MILITARY FORCES IN CIVILIAN SOCIETY
The military is not suited to operate within the domestic arena while
civil authority still exists. It is no accident that the civilian justice system
is entirely different from the military justice system, with its own proce-
dures and code of sometimes arcane offenses applicable only to military
personnel.96 To function, the military must literally play by its own
rules. Those rules include not only the regulations by which the military
operates but convey the military mindset as well. At the core, the mili-
tary is not a police organization. It is not organized as such, nor prop-
erly equipped, nor are its members extensively trained for such duty.97
Further, the military achieves its goals through the use of force,98 while
peace officers view force as a last resort.99
A. Military Forces and Police Agencies: Crucial Distinctions
1. The role of peace officers
The purpose of peace officers is to maintain order within civilian
society, and they are authorized to use force to perform their duties.
However, the force used must be reasonable and used only as a last re-
sort,"° though some states have authorized the use of deadly force as a
94. Id at 582.
95. Id. at 585-89.
96. See, e.g., Missing Movement, 10 U.S.C. § 887 (1988) (U.C.M.J. art. 87) (punishing
soldier for failing to embark with unit when ordered); Subordinate Compelling Surrender, id.
§ 900 (U.C.M.J. art. 100) (providing death penalty for military personnel who compel unit
commander to surrender); Improper Use of Countersign, id. § 901 (U.C.M.J. art. 101) (impos-
ing death penalty on those who knowingly transmit passwords to enemy during wartime);
Malingering, id. § 915 (U.C.M.J. art. 115) (punishing personnel that feign illness or injure
themselves to avoid duty).
97. See infra part III.C.4.
98. See FIELD MANUAL 7-10, supra note 32, at 1-1.
99. See Seigle, supra note 24, at 17. As part of Task Force Grizzly, the California Army
National Guard's anti-narcotics effort, squads of soldiers work closely with law enforcement
officers during surveillance operations. Nevertheless, the difference between the civilian and
military personnel is apparent: "The California Guard scouts, whose military training taught
them how to use overwhelming force, must follow the lead of the Border Patrol agent, who is
trained to use force only as a last resort." Id.
100. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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means to quell riots.10 1 Today, deadly force is only to be used in self-
defense, or, if necessary, to prevent harm to others or to stop the flight of
a dangerous felon.102
2. The role of military forces
Soldiers are not trained peace officers, and that distinction is crucial.
The mission of an infantry unit is "to close with the enemy to kill him,
destroy his equipment, and shatter his will to resist," 10 3 which is hardly
the role of a peace officer. In spite of this, among the first troops on the
streets of Los Angeles in 1992 were infantrymen 1" of the California
Army National Guard's 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized).10 5
Troops generally undertake domestic missions with the same gear
they carry into battle. The typical infantryman is armed with a rifle and
bayonet. 106 Sometimes, though, soldiers are armed with crew-served
machine guns and other heavy weapons in civilian assistance missions. 107
In civil disturbance operations, troops also carry what the soldiers in the
1992 riots called "L.A. Gear:" an armored "flak vest"10 and a kevlar
helmet with a riot face shield.109
101. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1985) (setting reasonableness stan-
dard for use of deadly force by peace officers). Individual states have differing standards for
the use of deadly force by police officers. See id at 16 nn.14-21.
102. Id. at 11-12. Even within the limits of the reasonableness standard, some law enforce-
ment agencies specially arm their officers for situations in which violence is considered espe-
cially likely. See, eg., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
964 (1975). However, the legal requirement of reasonableness in the use of force applies to
peace officers even when they are involved in volatile situations. See id. at 1271, 1278 (discuss-
ing situation in which heavily armed police officers killed two innocent students during distur-
bance at college campus); supra part II.C.
103. FIELD MANUAL 7-10, supra note 32, at I-1.
104. Because the combat-exclusion policy of the Department of the Army prohibits women
from assignment to positions in infantry units, infantry soldiers will be referred to within this
Comment as "infantrymen."
105. Greg Seigle, Waiting Around, Ready To Go, ARMY TIMES, May 18, 1992, at 15.
106. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 502
(1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION]. The weapons carried today are M16AI and
M16A2 assault rifles. U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 23-9: M16A1 AND M16A2 RIFLE
MARKSMANSHIP, at 2-2 (July 3, 1989) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 23-9]. The M16AI has
the capacity for fully automatic fire, while the M16A2 has a three-round burst capability. Id.
Both weapons use 20-round or 30-round magazines. Id.
107. During the riots of the 1960s, troops sometimes deployed with, and used, heavy weap-
ons like .50 caliber machine guns. See KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 106, at 55, 57, 278.
108. See Seigle, supra note 3 (describing the bullet-resistant armor worn by soldiers).
109. See Greg Seigle, Army Called to Quell Rioting in L.A., ARMY TIMES, May 11, 1992, at
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Soldiers train as they fight, with the expectation that they will fight
as they have trained.110 In Los Angeles in 1992, the military viewed the
threat as armed, organized gangs.II When deployed, the military forces,
which included Army, Marine Corps and federalized California National
Guard troops, 1 2 began setting up roadblocks and conducting aggressive
patrolling. 1 3 The approach to this civil disturbance was the same as if it
were a wartime theater of operations, and one Army officer even charac-
terized it as a MOUT-a Military Operation on Urban Terrain-the
Army's term for urban warfare.
14
Though carried out by civilian peace officers, the events surrounding
the case of Burton v. Waller1 5 serve to illustrate a typical "military-type
response" to a civilian disorder situation. In that case, a large group of
Mississippi Highway Patrolmen and officers of the local police depart-
ment confronted a group of students on the predominantly African-
American Jackson State College campus on May 15, 1970, less than two
weeks after the tragic events at Kent State.116 The police officers at the
campus were armed with a variety of rifles and automatic weapons.
1 17
They had been subjected to verbal abuse as well as volleys of bricks and
bottles, some of which had hit the officers.1"' The crowd was beginning
to disperse when the police saw muzzle flashes in the window of a
dormitory.119
110. See U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-101: BATrLE FOCUSED TRAINING, 1-4 to 1-5
(Sept. 30, 1992) (detailing Army training doctrine).
111. See Seigle, supra note 3, at 12-13 (noting that gang members were "looking for
trouble" and threatening soldiers).
112. The dual nature of the National Guard-having both state and federal responsibili-
ties-should not mislead the observer. National Guard troops are trained soldiers, and over
300,000 reservists, including National Guard troops, served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm from 1990 through 1991. BoB WOODWARD, TIE COMMANDERS 283-84 (1991). Stung
by the failure to achieve victory in Vietnam, the military purposely placed certain critical units
in the reserve components. Id. at 284. The purpose of this restructuring was to ensure that a
President would be unable to conduct a major military action without calling the citizen-
soldiers of the National Guard and Reserves to active duty, thereby "making it difficult or
impossible to slide slowly into war without the public's participation." Id.
113. See Seigle, supra note 3.
114. See id at 16.
115. 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975).
116. See CAMPUS UNRESr, supra note 40, at 287-90. Members of the Mississippi National
Guard mobilized to deal with the disorder at the Jackson State campus as well, but they
deployed only on the perimeter of the campus and were not involved in the events that led to
the deaths and injuries. Burton, 502 F.2d at 1269, 1272. For a discussion of the Kent State
incident, see infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
117. Burton, 502 F.2d at 1269.
118. Id at 1268-69.
119. Id. at 1270.
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The police opened fire.12 The military term for this technique is
"suppressive fire," directing so much firepower toward the enemy that a
sniper is unable to continue shooting.121 In less than thirty seconds the
peace officers "discharged between 121 and 153 rounds of ammunition
containing between them 793 and 1001 separate projectiles." '22 Two stu-
dents were killed and a number of others were injured.123 Ironically, the
window pane where the sniper was located was untouched by the bul-
lets. 24 While the Mississippi officers were unusually heavily armed,
1 25
their weaponry was light compared to that carried by the typical
soldier. 126
The use of heavily armed soldiers to protect African-American stu-
dents enrolling in Southern schools occurred without the loss of life dur-
ing the late-1950s and early-1960s.' 27 However, other uses of the
military were considerably bloodier. During the 1960s, troops killed a
number of persons while restoring order during riots in Los Angeles's
Watts area,128 Detroit 129 and Newark.130 However, the most horrific in-
cident took place at Kent State University.
1 3 '
On May 1, 1970, a mob of students and nonstudents began a protest
that rapidly turned violent.' 32 Protestors and others looted stores in
120. Id
121. See FIELD MANUAL 23-9, supra note 106, at 4-1 (explaining suppressive fire tech-
niques); see also FIELD MANUAL 7-10, supra note 32, at 4-29 (describing use of suppressive fire
during attack).
122. Burton, 502 F.2d at 1270.
123. Id at 1271.
124. Id
125. Id. at 1269.
126. See id at 1269 (discussing weapons carried by Mississippi police at Jackson State);
FIELD MANUAL 23-9, supra note 106, at 2-2 (discussing standard military weaponry). Ironi-
cally, the Mississippi National Guardsmen at Jackson State that day were specially equipped
for civil disturbance duty. Burton, 502 F.2d at 1272. Their commanding general testified at
the trial that most men carried shotguns loaded with birdshot. Id. The Guardsmen had also
instituted other special procedures to minimize injuries. Id
127. See Exec. Order No. 11,118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963) (ordering military to enforce
school desegregation orders in Alabama); Exec. Order No. 11,111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963)
(ordering military to "suppress unlawful assemblies, combinations, conspiracies and domestic
violence" in Alabama); Exec. Order No. 11,053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962) (ordering military
to enforce court desegregation orders in Mississippi); Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg.
7628 (1957) (ordering military to enforce school desegregation orders in Arkansas).
128. See KERNER CoMMIssIoN, supra note 106, at 20.
129. See id at 53-59.
130. See id at 36-38.
131. See generally CAMPUS UNREsr, supra note 40, at 233-410 (describing circumstances
surrounding Kent State shootings).
132. Id at 240-43.
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town, 133 and burned the campus Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
building. 134 Ohio Governor Rhodes, in response to a plea by the Mayor
of Kent, mobilized forces of the Ohio Army National Guard to restore
order to the town and campus.
1 35
The troops, combat soldiers from infantry and cavalry units,
deployed on the campus.1 36  One faculty member later described the
Guardsmen as "summertime soldiers. They're not professionals.
They're scared kids." 137 The mob of students approached, hurling rocks
and shouting obscenities. 138 The troops opened fire for reasons that re-
main unclear, and when the shooting ended four young Americans lay
dead. 139 In the aftermath of the shootings, the courts were faced with
questions of judicial oversight of executive military action' 4° and ques-
tions of civil liability.141 Even today, as the domestic role of the military
expands, these important questions remain unanswered.
142
B. The Organization of Military Forces in Civilian Support Missions
The command structure in a civilian support mission creates the po-
tential for misuse of military forces. When the military engages in com-
bat, it is critical that the chain of command be clearly defined from the
lowest foot soldier to the President, the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States. 43 Yet when the military engages in
civilian support missions the chain of command becomes much more
complex, making it virtually impossible to conduct coherent and syn-
chronized operations."4 Often, the military is suddenly subordinated to
civilian officials and agencies that may lack a meaningful understanding
of the appropriate and inappropriate uses of military forces.
133. Id at 241.
134. Id. at 248.
135. Id at 250.
136. Id at 269-70.
137. Id at 278.
138. Id. at 272-73.
139. Id at 273-74. In addition, nine others were seriously injured by National Guard gun-
fire. Id.
140. See infra part IV.B.
141. See infra part IV.
142. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
143. See WOODWARD, supra note 112, at 175-76; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
(making President Commander in Chief).
144. See, e.g., Healy & Stolberg, supra note 16. When the chain of command becomes
confused or subject to interference, military efficiency can suffer dramatically. See WOOD-
WARD, supra note 112, at 175-76. Needless interference in tactical operations by civilian lead-
ers during the S.S. Mayaguez crisis had been counterproductive, as it was later during the ill-
fated Beirut peacekeeping mission and the Grenada invasion. Id.
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This problem is especially pronounced when governors call National
Guard forces to state, as opposed to federal, active duty. A state gover-
nor may call forth the National Guard within the state and commit it to
civilian support missions without consulting the federal military chain of
command.1 45 As such, the governor is commander in chief of those
Guard units and may place them under the operational control of any
civilian organization he or she desires.
The federalized military avoids a similar situation by attempting to
remain under the usual military chain of command during civilian sup-
port missions. 146 This is not always possible to the extent that the mili-
tary might wish. As in the Los Angeles riots, the military must closely
coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, even to the point of tak-
ing mission assignments from the civilian Emergency Operations
Center.147
The military forces involved in the Los Angeles riot operation car-
ried out tasks selected by civilians.1 48 The civilian authorities, though
advised by military representatives assigned as liaisons, made the deci-
sions as to what missions were appropriate for the military forces. 149 In
Los Angeles, authorities ruled the killing of Marvin Rivas by soldiers
justified. 5 ' Such was not the case at Kent State, where Ohio Governor
Rhodes, in response to a plea from the Mayor of Kent and the President
of the University, assigned the Ohio National Guard to restore order to
the university campus, a task that in retrospect was not suitable for
armed soldiers.15 The Governor, the Mayor and civilian officials were
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. This is what took place on April 29, 1992, the first
night of the Los Angeles riots. See Seigle, supra note 109, at 6. The California Army National
Guard was not federalized (put under federal control) until May 1, 1992. See WEBSTER RE-
PORT, supra note 64, at 152-53; Seigle, supra note 3, at 12; see also CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 143 (Deering 1985) (describing chain of command for nonfederalized National Guard forces
placed under civilian control).
146. See Employment of Troops in Aid of Civilian Authorities: Command Authority, 32
C.F.R. § 501.3 (1992).
147. After many hours of delay, the California Army National Guard units responding to
the riots were directed to accept tasks from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's
Emergency Operations Center. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at 152; see also CAL.
MIL. & VET. CODE § 365 (Deering 1985) (describing civilian chain of command for National
Guard troops). Upon federalization, the units of the California Army National Guard were
incorporated into the active military chain of command. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note
64, at 153. The FBI was the lead agency for coordinating the federal efforts, including that of
the military forces. Id.
148. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at 153. The military forces, however, did refuse
some missions the civilian command structure assigned them. Id. at 153-54.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
151. See CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 287-90.
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unable to accurately assess the troops' training, capabilities and appropri-
ateness. The result was tragic. As the students surged toward the heav-
ily armed Guardsmen, the soldiers-feeling threatened and confused-
fired their weapons into the crowd.1 52 The Kent State killings stand as a
dramatic example of why military forces are inappropriate for such civil-
ian support missions.
C. Rules Governing Use of Deadly Force
Justly placing criminal or civil liability for wrongful death is diffi-
cult, both legally and practically, because of the poor fit between military
realities and the expectations of civilian law. A soldier is often expected
to act in ways that are entirely contrary to the conventions of civilian
law. No issue better illustrates the dichotomy than that of the use of
deadly force.
1. Deadly force standard for civilians
In general, civilians who are not peace officers have a right to use
deadly force only to protect themselves or others from death or great
bodily harm. 53 Civilians must have an actual fear that such harm is
imminent,1 54 with some commentators stating that fear must be objec-
tively reasonable.1 55
Peace officers are similarly restricted in their use of deadly force,
except in certain special situations.1 5
6 Prior to Tennessee v. Garner,157
peace officers were able to use deadly force against unarmed fleeing
felons.15 By holding that the use of deadly force to apprehend felons
who pose no danger to others constituted an "unreasonable" seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, 59 the Supreme Court limited police dis-
cretion. Today, police may use deadly force against those who reason-
152. See id
153. See John Q. La Fond, The Case for Liberalizing the Use of Deadly Force in Self-De-
fense, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 237, 237 & n.1 (1983).
154. See generally WAYNE R. LA FAVE & AUSTIN ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 394 (1972) (describing requirement that danger posed by aggressor must be imminent),
cited in La Fond, supra note 153, at 247 n.42.
155. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (requiring reasonable belief that force
used was "immediately necessary").
156. There is a common-law rule that deadly force may be used to quell riots. See infra
note 160 and accompanying text.
157. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
158. Id. at 4-5.
159. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
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ably appear to constitute a threat to others, whether the threat is to the
peace officers involved or to the populace at large."6
2. Military use of force in combat
The standard for use of force by the military not only permits the
use of deadly force against enemy combatants, 161 but requires deadly
force if the killing is pursuant to a lawful order.162 In wartime, the func-
tion of the military is to kill the enemy.163 The Federal Tort Claims Act
specifically exempts from its provisions liability for military forces en-
gaged in combat. 16 While the killing of enemy combatants during war-
time is considered justified, the military does prosecute personnel accused
of killing either civilian noncombatants1 65 or captured enemy combat-
ants.166 This gives soldiers broad authority to use deadly force. For ex-
ample, following the Persian Gulf War, which lasted only six weeks,
estimates of the numbers of Iraqis killed ran as high as 100,000.67
160. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. However, the common law of torts recognizes a civil im-
munity privilege "for the purpose of suppressing a riot or preventing the other [person] from
participating in it... if the riot is one which threatens death or serious bodily harm." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 142(2) (1965); see also Smith v. United States, 330 F.
Supp. 867, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 142(2) (1965)
and holding that shooting of plaintiff by National Guardsmen could not be maintained under
exception to Federal Tort Claims Act). Like the privilege of self defense, this special privilege
requires a reasoned assessment of an imminent danger by the user of deadly force. Burton v.
Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975). In Burton, the
standard for determining what is and what is not a "riot" was low. See id; see also supra notes
115-26 (discussing facts of Burton). The fact that most of the mob was retreating did not end
the riotous state. Id. at 1277. A jury need find only that a riot existed and that the officer felt
the affray threatened death or serious bodily injury to himself or others to find the homicide
justified. Id. at 1275-76.
161. See FIELD MANUAL 7-10, supra note 32, at 1-1.
162. Failure to Obey Order or Regulation, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1988) (U.C.M.J. art. 92).
163. See FIELD MANUAL 7-10, supra note 32, at 1-1.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988).
165. See United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 537-40, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22-25 (1973)
(describing My Lai massacre committed by American troops in Vietnam in 1968), affid sub
nom. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
166. See Soldier Acquitted in Panama Slaying, AP, Sept. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, AP File (describing Army sergeant's acquittal on charge of shooting Panamanian
prisoner).
167. See Melissa Healy & John M. Broder, Number of Iraqis Killed May Never Be Known,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991, at A7. While American forces did not compile official totals, esti-
mates of Iraq's dead during the Gulf War run from 30,000 to 100,000. Id United States
military forces killed an estimated 444,000 enemy soldiers and guerrillas in Vietnam. Id In
Grenada, 45 Grenadian soldiers were killed. Id. In Panama, 50 enemy soldiers were killed.
Id.
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3. The use of deadly force by military forces in civilian
support operations
While the liberal use of deadly force has been permitted in martial
law situations, 16 troops in peacetime usually have no greater authority
to employ deadly force than civilian peace officers. 169 For example, in
Manley v. State 170 a Texas National Guardsman was assigned to prevent
anyone from crossing a barricaded road during a visit to Dallas by Presi-
dent Taft. 7 ' When a civilian attempted to pass through the prohibited
area to catch a streetcar, Private Manley fatally wounded him with a
bayonet.17 2 The court found:
[H]e must be judged as any other officer, and, if it did not at the
time reasonably appear that he was in danger of losing his life
or suffering some serious bodily injury, he would not have the
right to take human life, and, if he does so under such circum-
stances, he must pay the penalty of the law." 3
On its face, the rule appears clear, but circumstances unique to the
military's role make the boundaries of the rule uncertain.174 A soldier is
not the same as "any other officer." 175 He or she is equipped differently,
trained differently and operates within a system totally unlike that of ci-
vilian law enforcement officers.1 76 The application of civilian standards
to military personnel operating domestically creates a host of
problems. 177
4. Problems in applying use of force rules to military
civilian support missions
a. situational considerations
The chaotic and dangerous circumstances under which troops oper-
ate in civilian support missions make it difficult to determine legal rea-
sonability. Federal troops rarely participate in "normal" law
enforcement operations because federal law'1 8 limits their internal use to
168. See Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 A. 952, 957-58 (Pa. 1903) (hold-
ing soldier guiltless for killing that occurred during martial rule).
169. See Manley v. State, 137 S.W. 1137, 1141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
170. 137 S.W. 1137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
171. Id. at 1138.
172. Id at 1140.
173. d at 1141.
174. See infra part III.C.4.
175. Manley, 137 S.W. at 1141.
176. See supra part II.C.4.
177. See supra part II.C.4.
178. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
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emergencies as determined by the President. 7 9 National Guard soldiers,
like Private Manley, on the other hand, sometimes operate in normal law
enforcement situations, because, unless federalized by the President of
the United States, 180 they are at the disposal of the state governor and
sometimes assist in such routine law enforcement operations as searches
for fugitives or providing security.18'
The military most frequently is called out after the situation has de-
teriorated to a point at which only drastic action can restore order.
8 2
Soldiers usually assist civilian law enforcement in dangerous, volatile sit-
uations."' Such situations make the use of deadly force much more
likely, not only because of the dangers the troops are likely to encounter,
but because the civilian command structure may not have the expertise
to limit military participation to appropriate situations.
184
Another consideration is that in volatile situations, the soldiers may
feel personally threatened. As in the Kent State incident,' that threat
may seem unreasonable to the casual observer. Still, murder prosecu-
tions like that of Private Manley' 86 are uncommon, perhaps because
prosecutors may be reluctant to prosecute law enforcement personnel for
abusive use of deadly force.' 8 7 There may also be a great deal of sympa-
thy among the police who actually investigate the homicide. 88 These
institutional factors could effectively insulate guilty troops from justice,
even though their actions were demonstrably culpable.
179. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., National Guard Patrols Florida Highway Hit by Sniper Attacks, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1992, at A13 (stating that Florida Army National Guard troops were ordered to patrol
dangerous stretch of freeway).
182. See supra part II.C.4.
183. The situations that call for military intervention often involve a high proportion of
criminals among the civilians. See Fine, supra note 38, at 1723-24. For example, in the De-
troit riot of 1967, 48.6% of those arrested for riot-related offenses had criminal records. Id. In
the Newark riots of 1967, 45% had criminal records. Iad In the Watts riot of 1965, 73% of
those arrested had criminal records. Id
184. See supra part III.B.
185. See generally CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 233-410 (describing circumstances
of Kent State incident).
186. Manley v. State, 137 S.W. 1137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
187. Gerald F. Uelmen, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the
Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 1, 63 (1973) (noting lack of
enthusiasm for prosecution in police homicide cases).
188. Id. at 38, 41 (noting that police officers expect support for actions and are reluctant to
investigate police shootings).
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b. military training and equipment
Soldiers are not normally trained to make legal distinctions when
conducting dangerous operations, and, unlike peace officers, soldiers are
usually taught civilian rules governing the use of deadly force only when
on the verge of beginning a civilian support mission.18 9 Commanders
provide their soldiers with "rules of engagement,"'190 but, especially in
tense situations, there is great potential to misinterpret "reasonability."
Private Manley made one such misinterpretation, which resulted in the
unnecessary death of a civilian. 91 The Ohio Guardsmen at Kent State
made the same mistake.192 Five lives were lost between these two inci-
dents because military forces acted in what were, in retrospect, clearly
unreasonable manners.1
93
Because of the weapons the military uses, determining which indi-
vidual soldier is responsible for an unlawful military homicide is another
practical problem. This is especially difficult in a mass fire situation like
the one that occurred at Jackson State.194 Soldiers generally carry auto-
matic weapons, though in some cases they are modified to allow only
semi-automatic fire.1 95 Still, in less than a minute, a squad of eleven in-
fantrymen with M16AI assault rifles could fire 660 rounds. 19 6 The sheer
number of projectiles makes it difficult to determine which soldier shot
what victim. In addition, the visual identification of a particular soldier
is made especially difficult by the uniforms and equipment of the soldiers.
For example, troops wear protective ("gas") masks when using tear gas,
which completely obscures the soldiers' faces.19 7
189. See, eg., Seigle, supra note 3 (noting that soldiers deployed in Los Angeles received
rules of engagement to guide use of deadly force).
190. See iL
191. Manley v. State, 137 S.W. 1137, 1140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
192. See CAMPUS UNRESr, supra note 40, at 273-74.
193. See id,
194. Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1271 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975). "Investigators could not trace the path of any of the projectiles to determine which
specific person fired them. Nor were shotgun pellets recovered from those wounded or killed
traceable to specific weapons.. .." Id
195. See Seigle, supra note 3, at 15.
196. This assumes each soldier fires two complete 30-round magazines. Troops are trained
in high-volume fire techniques. See FIELD MANUAL 23-9, supra note 106, at 4-1 to -14.
197. See, eg., CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 305-409 (depicting National Guardsmen
in protective masks at Kent State).
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c. military orders and deadly force
Federal law requires a soldier to obey the lawful orders of his or her
superiors. 198 However, deciding that an order is "unlawful" can be haz-
ardous because a soldier risks punishment if the order turns out to be
lawful.199 Although in Manley v. State2"° the court listed Private Man-
ley's possible alternatives to deadly force, in his mind the soldier could
have felt confused and trapped in a no-win situation. Private Manley
could have chosen not to stop the intruder, and thus disobey his com-
mander, or he could have used what means he had at hand-a bayonet-
to stop the trespasser. Manley made his choice, and as a result was
charged with murder.2" 1
At times, military personnel find their equipment and training pre-
vent them from complying with their orders.202 Because of their unique
weaponry 203 and training,204 military forces have a greater potential to
cause casualties than normally equipped police forces.2"5 For example,
although military rules of engagement in a civilian support operation
may order troops to "shoot to wound, '206 the troops are trained to aim
for vital areas of the body and require retraining to conform with the new
guidance.20 7 Putting forces trained and equipped to kill in a situation in
which force can be used only as a last resort invites disaster.
d. liability within the command structure
Determining which parties within the command structure are liable
for unlawful uses of force is another problem. Although soldiers operate
under orders, they are not protected from criminal liability for carrying
198. See Failure to Obey Order or Regulation, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1988) (U.C.M.J. art. 92);
see also Commonwealth ex reL Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 A. 952, 957-56 (Pa. 1903) (holding
that soldier is bound to obey orders of officers unless orders are facially illegal).
199. Manley v. State, 137 S.W. 1137, 1141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
200. 137 S.W. 1137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
201. Id at 1138.
202. See discussion supra part III.B.4.b.
203. See discussion supra part III.C.4.b.
204. See Seigle, supra note 33, at 16 (contrasting skills taught in regular military training
with skills required in civil disturbance operations).
205. Police are equipped with military-style weaponry only in exceptional circumstances.
See discussion supra part III.A; cf Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1269 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (describing instance in which police officers were armed similarly
to soldiers).
206. See Seigle, supra note 33 (discussing standard wartime procedure of shooting to kill);
see also Burton, 502 F.2d at 1273 (detailing orders given Mississippi National Guardsmen
ordering them to fire at legs of rioters instead of their heads).
207. See Seigle, supra note 33.
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out an illegal order, nor is the officer who gives that order.2"' Yet, there
are many layers of officers between a governor or President and the
soldiers. Though an officer is responsible for the acts of those he or she
commands, it is difficult to determine how far up the hierarchy criminal
or civil liability should extend." 9
In situations involving a reckless or even an "abandoned and malig-
nant ' ' 21° killing, to whom liability extends is unclear. For example, as-
sume an officer, who knows innocents in the area will likely be killed,
orders his or her soldiers to fire into a crowd to kill what he or she thinks
to be a sniper. While the soldiers are unquestionably able to use deadly
force to defend themselves from the sniper, the method chosen by the
officer might be so out of proportion to the threat as to expose the troops
to possible liability. However, states may attempt to protect soldiers
from personal liability for acts performed in the line of duty.2 "
Another issue regarding liability is determining where liability ends.
Liability could theoretically rise until it reached the commander in chief.
Except in the case of a clear order to kill without justification, culpability
grows more and more abstract as one reaches higher in the ranks for
liability.2 12
208. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (U.C.M.J. art. 92); see also Commonwealth ex reL. Wadsworth v.
Shortall, 55 A. 952, 956-57 (Pa. 1903) (noting that soldier is bound to obey orders of officers
unless orders are facially illegal).
209. See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1178 (1973) (Army officer charged in
killings committed by soldiers under his command). There are situations in which some form
of liability might extend to a commanding officer for the actions of his or her troops. For
instance, if a lieutenant who ordered his or her soldier to shoot a nonthreatening person for
violating the curfew, such an unjustified shooting would be murder. See 1 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *400.
210. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Deering 1985).
211. See, eg., CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 366 (Deering 1985) ("[The commanding officer
shall use his discretion with respect to the propriety of attacking or firing on any mob .... His
honest and reasonable judgment in the exercise of his duty shall be full protection, civilly and
criminally, for any act or acts done while on duty."); id. § 392 (Deering 1985) ("Members of
the militia in the active service of the State shall not be liable civilly or criminally for any act or
acts done by them in the performance of their duty."); id. § 393 (Deering Supp. 1992) (indem-
nifying soldiers for acts done by them while on duty). Note that these regulations, on their
faces, protect only service members on state duty. Id. The troops in Los Angeles were ini-
tially on state duty. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at 152 app. 14. However, they
were soon federalized. Id. The immunity rules for federal officials are more complicated. See
supra part IV.C.
Of course, troops on state active duty are still subject to federal civil rights legislation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Kent State plaintiffs brought suit against soldiers of the Ohio
National Guard under that statute. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430,433 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd
sub nor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). For a discussion of federal civil rights
claims, see supra note 35.
212. For example, it is difficult for a lieutenant colonel who commands a hypothetical in-
fantry battalion of 800 soldiers in six separate companies to know the quirks, foibles and abili-
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Theoretically, culpability could extend beyond the military ranks.
Civilian officials customarily control the military in civilian opera-
tions.213 Eventually, however, culpability fades as it passes through
higher and higher echelons.2 14 For example, whereas Lieutenant Calley,
the Army officer whose platoon murdered well over 100 Vietnamese in
the infamous My Lai Massacre, was convicted of murder, the division
commander, four levels of command above Lieutenant Calley, was not
likewise court-martialed. 215 Moreover, no civilian officials responsible
for American policy in Vietnam were charged, though the acts of the
civilians who made policy placed American troops in a situation where
the crime was likely to occur.216
Thus, civilian leaders can place troops in situations in which troops
might unlawfully use deadly force. However, whether the use of deadly
force is due to inappropriate training, a limitation of the soldiers' equip-
ment, a misunderstanding of the law, or unwise or even illegal orders
from above, the soldiers alone will pay the price if a suit follows.
217
Still, when a soldier must make a decision whether to act, he or she
cannot know how a court might view his or her decision months or years
later.218 Shielded from liability, the military leadership and the civilians
that control it are able to use the military without accepting the corre-
sponding responsibility.
ties of every one of his or her individual soldiers. Liability, if extended that far, might turn on
such issues as the level of training proficiency the unit has achieved. For example, the lieuten-
ant colonel could not reasonably be held liable for the deployment of an unstable soldier, but
culpability for negligence might attach if the lieutenant colonel deployed his or her troops
knowing they were untrained in the proper use of deadly force.
213. See 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 517 (1860). Since before the Civil War the military has remained
strictly under civilian control when conducting civilian law enforcement-type missions. Cf
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 365 (Deering 1985) (describing state military forces' chain of com-
mand civilian control with tactical control in actual execution of military operations left to
military command structure). But see Rick Maze, Pentagon May Get Disaster-Relief Role
Back, ARMY TIMEs, Sept. 21, 1992 at 26 (discussing move in Congress to have Pentagon take
over certain duties of Federal Emergency Management Agency after its lackluster perform-
ance in wake of Hurricane Andrew).
214. See United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), affid sub nom.
Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
215. Id. at 534, 48 C.M.R. at 19.
216. For a concise discussion of how high-level military and civilian officials escaped shar-
ing blame for the massacre of civilians at My Lai, see Ron Ridenhour, 'It Was a Nazi Kind of
Thing', L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at B7.
217. Some states have acted to protect soldiers from personal liability. See supra note 211.
218. See discussion infra part IV.C.
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMMUNITY ISSUES
A party claiming to be injured, or in danger of being injured, due to
a military civilian support mission, may well find him or herself unable to
obtain relief, whether in the form of damages or an injunction. This is
the result of various civil immunities held by the government, govern-
ment officials and personnel engaged in civilian support operations. Such
immunities are necessary to allow the government to perform its most
basic functions. However, the price paid is that injured parties are de-
nied relief. This effect is even more pronounced when the military be-
comes involved.
In the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal government has waived
its sovereign immunity in some, but not all, cases.2 9 In addition, both
the executive220 and the military personnel221 he or she commands are
often, though not always, protected from civil liability for actions taken
during civilian support missions.222 The courts have attempted to bal-
ance the commander in chief's prerogatives and military necessity with
the basic protections and remedies for civilians, with a tendency toward
favoring the executive and the military.22 3
Civilian support operations are inherently dangerous because they
rely on military forces to perform tasks for which they are not suited.224
Moreover, the civilian organizational structure under which the military
must function may not have the expertise to appropriately employ mili-
tary forces. 225 The result is that civilian society is exposed to the rela-
tively high risks that come with the use of the military226 while being
denied the legal recourses normally available to an injured party, such as
injunctions and damages because of the need to protect the freedom of
the executive and the military in carrying out their duties.227
A. Federal Government Liability
A suit for damages against the U.S. government is attractive to a
plaintiff for two reasons. First, military personnel are often immune
from civil suits for actions taken during the course of their duties.228 Sec-
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
220. See infra part IV.B.
221. See infra part IV.C.
222. See infra part IV.B-C.
223. See infra part IV.B-C.
224. See discussion supra part III.C.4.d.
225. See discussion supra part III.B.
226. See discussion supra part III.
227. See discussion infra part IV.B-C.
228. See discussion infra part IV.C.2.
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ond, even if immunity is not applicable, military personnel generally have
only limited funds with which to pay judgments.229 As a result, the only
way for a plaintiff to recover damages is to sue the federal government.
The Federal Tort Claims Act230 specifically defines government em-
ployees as including "members of the military or naval forces of the
United States, [and] members of the National Guard while engaged in
training or duty" under Title 32.231 Soldiers "acting in the line of duty"
are considered to be "acting within the scope of [their] office or employ-
ment," '232 and thus the United States becomes liable for their actions.
In Cerri v. United States,233 a soldier on guard duty on a public
wharf in San Francisco tried to shoot a fleeing civilian misdemeanant.1
34
He missed, striking and severely injuring a civilian bystander.2 35 The
court found that the soldier's use of greater force than required, or even
allowed, did not bring him outside of the scope of his duties, and there-
fore, the United States government was liable.236
In civilian support missions circumstances can become more com-
plex. For example, a situation might arise in which the soldier's use of
deadly force is not negligent, but the decision to deploy the troops into
the area is. Though troops are cautioned to avoid casualties among in-
nocents, soldiers may potentially use justifiable deadly force to kill non-
combatants. Without a claim of negligence against the soldiers for using
their weapons, the victim has no remedy available from the federal gov-
ernment because the civilian officials ultimately responsible for the de-
ployment are generally immune from liability.237
If the soldier who pulled the trigger is not negligent, either because
the soldier's use of deadly force was justified or because he or she was
acting in good faith adherence to lawful orders, then the only other the-
ory on which to seek recovery would be a negligent deployment theory,
as was used against the officials of the State of Ohio after Kent State.23 8
Yet, the Federal Tort Claims Act specifically exempts military deci-
229. See Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920
(1977).
230. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
231. 32 U.S.C. §§ 316, 502-505 (1988).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
233. 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
234. Id. at 832.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 835.
237. See infra part IV.B.
238. See Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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sions.239 Actions by the military in wartime are also specifically ex-
empted from the waiver of sovereign immunity granted by the Federal
Tort Claims Act,24° which indicates that Congress had some recognition
of the type of rapid, critical and perhaps not fully examined decisions
that are made by soldiers under fire.
In short, victims of an improper use of force may sometimes recover
from the federal government. A large loophole remains, however, when
the use of force does not constitute negligence but still injures an inno-
cent party.
B. Assessing Liability upon the Political Leadership
1. Responsibility of state officials
In some cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to sue state officials for
injuries caused by military use of force. For instance, in Krause v.
Rhodes,24 one of the cases emerging from the Kent State incident, the
plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a claim to recover damages from the
"Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General and Assistant Adjutant Gen-
eral of the Ohio National Guard, various officers and enlisted men of the
National Guard and the President of the University ' 242 under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983243 and under Ohio's wrongful death statutes. 2' The plaintiffs,
representatives of those killed, alleged
that the defendants conspired to call out the National Guard
and were guilty of wanton, wilful and negligent conduct when
they knew or should have known that there was no cause or
insufficient cause therefor; that the troops were not properly
trained in the correct and reasonable use of weapons to sup-
press civil disorders; and that the troops were permitted to be
armed with loaded weapons.245
Plaintiffs fied a similar suit in Ohio's courts,2" but the Ohio
Supreme Court eventually dismissed the case on grounds of sovereign
immunity because the Assembly had not made the state subject to suit by
waiving its sovereign immunity.247 In Krause, the court refused to rein-
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
240. Id. § 2680(j).
241. 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
242. Id. at 430.
243. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
244. Krause, 471 F.2d at 433.
245. Id.
246. See Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972).
247. Id at 745.
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state the federal suit.248 The court reasoned that the officials involved
were immune from liability because of the positions they held within the
state government.249 The court also held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment25 ° barred such a suit against the State of Ohio because the defend-
ants were acting in the "interests of the State in the performance of its
highest function, namely, the suppression of riots or insurrection and the
protection of the public."25
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the dismissal.252 It or-
dered the trial court on remand to consider
whether the Governor and his subordinate officers were acting
within the scope of their duties under the Constitution and laws
of Ohio; whether they acted within the range of discretion per-
mitted the holders of such office under Ohio law and whether
they acted in good faith both in proclaiming an emergency and
as to the actions taken to cope with the emergency so declared.
Similarly, the complaints place directly in issue whether the
lesser officers and the enlisted personnel of the Guard acted in
good-faith obedience to the orders of their superiors.25 3
The Supreme Court's decision strengthened the judiciary's ability to
scrutinize state executives when plaintiffs make allegations that their civil
rights were deprived under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Moyer v. Peabody254 the
Supreme Court created a "good faith" test to judge the actions of state
officials who take drastic steps to deal with civil disorder. Like the Kent
State cases, Moyer was an action under section 1983, this time seeking
damages from former state officials, including the ex-Governor, for the
plaintiff's imprisonment by military forces.2 5 Justice Holmes, upholding
the dismissal of the complaint, wrote that a governor may
make the ordinary use of the soldiers[,] . . .may kill persons
who resist, and, of course,... may use the milder measure of
seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the
way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for
punishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exer-
cise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good
faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to
248. Krause, 471 F.2d at 433.
249. Id. at 438-39.
250. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
251. Krause, 471 F.2d at 433-38.
252. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
253. Id. at 250.
254. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
255. Id. at 82.
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head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and
cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the
ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief.
2
-
6
While the Court in Moyer seemed to create a "good faith" standard,
in practical terms plaintiffs cannot use the standard as a means to avoid
official immunity because courts are usually reluctant to interfere with
executives acting in accordance with what the Sixth Circuit called the
"highest function" of an executive.25 7 In Scheuer v. Rhodes25" the
Supreme Court chose to distance itself from the previous holding in Ster-
ling v. Constantin,259 stating that in determining whether civil disorder
requires a military response, a governor's "decision to that effect is con-
clusive. ' 21 The Court allowed trial on the issue of whether the Gover-
nor of Ohio and his officials acted in good faith in declaring an
emergency and in the actions they took to deal with the disorder.261
Nevertheless, the Court has held the legislative branch of state gov-
ernments immune from suit, granting immunity to state legislators in the
earlier decision of Tenney v. Brandhove.262 The Justices noted the impor-
tance of legislative independence in holding that the legislators were enti-
tled to immunity.
263
The Court's decision in Scheuer may have turned on the unusual
facts of the case, for the incident at Kent State was not a typical "riot."
The rioting at Kent State was related to a political movement, specifi-
cally, opposition to the Vietnam War in general and the invasion of Cam-
bodia in particular.2" In Los Angeles, the disorder seemed to have less
to do with a coherent political agenda than raw, unfocused rage.2 65 In
that situation, the perception was that the mobs consisted of opportunis-
tic looters and "gangbangers. "266 Similarly, when guarding against loot-
ers in disaster-stricken areas or searching for drug smugglers, troops will
256. Id. at 84-85.
257. Krause, 471 F.2d at 433.
258. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
259. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
260. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 250.
261. Id.
262. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
263. Id. at 377-79.
264. See CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 287 (noting that disorder was sparked by U.S.
invasion of Cambodia).
265. See Seigle, supra note 3.
266. A survey conducted by the Webster Commission in Los Angeles after the riots asked
the following question: "If some victims were targeted, whom do you believe did the target-
ing?" Thirty-five percent of respondents named "Gangs," while 42% named "Opportunists."
See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at app. 16 (question 30).
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face persons engaging in criminal activities rather than those taking part,
however inappropriately, in a political debate.
Another factor is the nature of the civilians that the military faced.
At Kent State, the troops faced middle-class college students.267 A court
may be much more willing to examine the actions of an elected official or
officer when the victims are so familiar and attractive. Contrast the mid-
dle-class college students at Kent State with alleged drug dealer Marvin
Rivas, 261 and it is clear that dead students will garner much more
sympathy.
The two incidents are distinct in another way as well. The popular
perception is that at Kent State something went terribly wrong,269 while,
in contrast, many considered the use of troops in Los Angeles a suc-
cess.270 It seems that if all goes well, courts consider the deployment and
use of troops reasonable, but a disaster renders the decision unreasona-
ble. For example, in Krause, the plaintiffs cited the fact that the troops
carried loaded weapons as one of the allegations of negligent conduct.
2 71
However, until the shooting began, there was no cause of action on that
particular issue. The courts are reluctant to examine the operational as-
pects of military employment, such as how the troops are equipped, and
are reluctant to act until after the damage is done.272 In other words,
there is no way to challenge civilian officials on the deployment of troops
or on operational policy in civilian support operations without some dis-
aster taking place, because few courts will be willing to question the judg-
ment of civilian authorities until after circumstances demonstrate that
something went wrong.
In connection with the Kent State incident, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the availability of injunctive relief to prohibit the Governor from
calling out troops, as well as to monitor the soldiers' training and opera-
tions.273 Student leaders at Kent State brought their suit in Gilligan in
an effort to place the Ohio National Guard under judicial supervision.274
The Supreme Court refused to sanction a judicial intrusion into the mili-
267. See CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 235 (finding that most Kent State students
came from middle-class backgrounds).
268. See Feldman, supra note 2, at A25 (detailing killing of Rivas by soldiers).
269. See CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 40, at 287-90 (characterizing shootings as tragedy).
270. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at app. 16; Seigle, supra note 3, at 15.
271. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nomL Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
272. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). While the U.S. Supreme Court did not
state that injunctive relief for activities of the military is never appropriate, it recognized mili-
tary training, orders and equipment as constituting nonjusticiable issues. Id.
273. Id. at 11-12.
274. Id. at 3.
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tary arena, holding that the case presented nonjusticiable issues.275 The
employment of the state military, it held, was clearly within the province
of the executive.276 The Court found it inappropriate to intervene by
using injunctive relief and judicial supervision of the training and opera-
tional aspects of the Ohio National Guard.2 7 7
In Scheuer, the Court clarified its holding in Gilligan by stating that
the G'lligan Court had not held the actions of the Guard "beyond judi-
cial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for
violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel,
whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.' 278 Thus, the Supreme
Court made remedies available to plaintiffs, but only in the most extreme
cases, and only after the damage was done.
As a result, there are two primary, and seemingly contradictory,
negative effects of Gilligan. First, the courts have established that in cer-
tain cases they are willing to impose judicial scrutiny on tactical military
operations, notwithstanding the courts' distinctly limited expertise in the
area. On the other hand, the courts may be the only institution able to
check the executive use of the military; yet the courts are reluctant to act
before a tragedy occurs.
2. Responsibility of federal civilian officials
a. powers of the President to use military forces
The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions. '2 79 The Constitution designates the President
275. Id. Nonjusticiable political questions are those in which
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). "Any such relief, whether it prescribed standards of
training and weaponry or simply ordered compliance with the standards set by Congress and/
or the Executive, would necessarily draw the courts into a nonjusticiable political question,
over which we have no jurisdiction." Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 619 (1972) (Cele-
brezze, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I (1973).
276. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
277. Id. "It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly respon-
sible-as the Judicial Branch is not-to the electoral process." Id.
278. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973)).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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of the United States the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed
Forces and of the militia of each state.280 The President makes the deci-
sion to commit federal forces internally in cases of insurrection, 28 1 to
enforce federal authority282 or to suppress disturbances that interfere
with state or federal law.2" 3 Yet, the President's power to use the mili-
tary is limited by Congress.
2 4
The Supreme Court has recognized the President's broad authority
to use the military in the international arena. 28 5 However, it has often
deferred to executive domestic decision making during wartime, such as
in the Prize Cases,28 6 in which the Court acknowledged President Lin-
coln's power to determine what degree of military force was necessary to
prevent the secession of the South in the Civil War.287 It held that the
President had the same degree of power to confront a domestic insurrec-
tion as he or she could exercise in a conflict against a foreign enemy.288
A second notable decision was Korematsu v. United States, 289 in
which the Supreme Court upheld the military decision to exclude Ameri-
cans of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United States dur-
ing World War 11.290 Justice Black noted that although racially based
restrictions are "immediately suspect,, 29 1 military necessity justified ex-
cluding Americans of Japanese descent from their homes on the West
Coast of the United States.2 92 The decision demonstrated that during
wartime, the courts would show great deference to the executive, even
when military decisions affected American civilians.
The Supreme Court also has limited the President's power to use the
military within the United States. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V.
Sawyer,293 President Truman ordered the military to seize and operate
steel mills that were about to be closed by a nationwide steelworker
strike.294 The Supreme Court found President Truman's action uncon-
280. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
281. 10 U.S.C. § 331.
282. Id. § 332.
283. Id. § 333.
284. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
285. See, e-g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
286. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). These cases concerned the disposition of vessels
seized for violating the Union blockade of Southern ports. Id. at 637-44.
287. Id. at 670.
288. Id.
289. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
290. Id. at 215, 219.
291. Id. at 216.
292. Id. at 223-24.
293. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
294. Id. at 582-83.
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stitutional.295 While the case is known mainly for its treatment of the
constitutional scope of executive authority, the President used military
means to exercise the power he claimed.296 President Truman asserted
that he was authorized to act internally-in this case, to use troops to
seize and operate American steel mills-as well as internationally.
297
The Court rejected this argument, finding no specific authority from
Congress for such an action.298 The President can act as Commander in
Chief internally only under specific limits set by the Congress and the
Constitution.29 9 President Truman's attempt to use troops within the na-
tion's borders to execute policy is analogous to what some contemporary
commentators have suggested.3°
Yet, there is a great deal of latitude within those limits. In Laird v.
Tatum,3°' the Supreme Court examined the Army's program of domestic
surveillance of civilian political activity.3 2 The military had been gath-
ering intelligence on what it perceived as potential opponents in order to
better prepare itself for domestic operations.3 3 In Tatum, these poten-
tial opponents were not the forces of enemy nations but individual activ-
ists and activist groups within the United States.3°4 The plaintiffs
claimed that the Army's surveillance activities "chilled" their freedom of
association rights in violation of the First Amendment. 30 5 A five-to-four
majority found the case nonjusticiable.3 °6 As in Korematsu v. United
States,3°7 individual rights in Laird gave way to the power of the execu-
tive's discretion to use the military internally.
b. executive power and immunity
Even if courts are willing to examine the actions of federal officials
in cases in which deployment leads to unnecessary injuries, the courts
will not necessarily hold officials responsible for those actions. If acting
lawfully in the performance of his or her duties, the President and his or
295. Id. at 587.
296. Id. at 582.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 585-89.
299. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13, 15 (stating Congress's authority to limit
President); id. art. II, § 2, cl. I (vesting in President powers as Commander in Chief).
300. See supra note 14.
301. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
302. Id. at 2.
303. Id. at 5.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 13.
306. Id. at 15.
307. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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her civilian subordinates are immune from civil liability.3°8 The courts
properly wish to leave the President free to act, personally and through
civilian assistants, to decisively deal with violent disorder.30 9
The executive branch would be paralyzed if every decision it made
were subject to suit for every error in judgment.310 When armed soldiers
are sent into a civilian area to conduct civil disturbance operations there
is a great potential for improper use of force. 1 In these matters, courts
are unwilling to bind the hands of the executive too tightly by allowing
liability for the improper use of military forces, unless the case is
extreme.
Consequently, the check on that authority is institutional: If abuses
of executive discretion are not checked within the executive branch itself,
the legislature can check them.31 2 The judiciary, without the appropriate
tools to analyze and evaluate the data that make up the final decision,
will avoid judicial second-guessing. The discretionary function exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act explicitly recognizes this principle by
specifically refusing to permit recovery for claims based upon "the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused. '31
3
308. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise
their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the
course of those duties . .. [and that] the threat [of such suits] might appreciably
inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.
Id. at 571. The Speech and Debate Clause grants members of Congress broad civil immunity
against suits related to their legislative duties. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. While there is no
constitutional equivalent for the executive branch, there are common-law protections that pro-
tect the President from suits related to his or her official duties. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731, 750 n.31 (1982). In Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that the President had absolute
immunity for actions taken within his authority. Id. at 756-57; see infra text accompanying
notes 330-35. For a more detailed discussion of executive immunity for civil rights violations,
see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION § 8.6, at 402-19 (1989).
309. "As well stated by Mr. Justice White, 'The most basic function of any government is to
provide for the security of the individual and of his property.'" Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d
430, 437 n.2 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
310. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 571.
311. See supra part III.C.4.
312. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 757-58 (noting that
congressional check on President's powers provides counterbalance to privilege of absolute
immunity from civil suits arising from official duties).
313. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988); see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36
(1953) (holding federal government immune from liability for discretionary governmental
actions).
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On the other hand, freedom from liability for negligent use of the
military, and the corresponding freedom to act, makes it easier for an
executive to inappropriately commit troops. The executive, when acting
within the wide latitude provided by the Constitution and by statute, has
few checks on his or her actions.3 14 The electorate may check the actions
of the executive, but this alone cannot prevent an unnecessary or inap-
propriate deployment of troops because presidential elections only occur
once every four years. 31" Further, the voters are likely to check the ac-
tions of the executive only if the employment is unsuccessful, for some-
times the decision to put troops on the streets impresses voters more than
it dismays them.316
Finally, the press may serve as a check on the President's actions.317
However, if the voters support the action of the executive, the power of
the press would seem of limited value as a counterweight to the privilege
of absolute immunity. This is especially true if military forces are only
used in situations involving discrete groups within society-such as resi-
dents of inner cities-instead of the majority of voters.
Today, a majority of citizens consider the military a highly efficient
institution that can accomplish projects where other public bodies fail. 318
Faced by intransigent problems, like drug abuse and illegal immigration,
and terrifying bursts of rage, like the Los Angeles riots, politicians can-
not help but view the military as a panacea because today's leaders are
more concerned with short-term political gain than by the danger the
Founders recognized. Unfortunately, the Founders' warnings are forgot-
ten today.
C. Assessing Liability of Military Personnel
Different military forces can be involved in civilian support opera-
tions, and liability varies depending on the status of the military unit.
The organizations of most concern in this Comment are the National
Guard on state active duty and troops of the active Army, Marine Corps
and federalized National Guard units.3 19
314. See supra part IV.B.2.a.
315. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
316. See WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 64, at app. 16 (question 31) (reporting 80% of
those surveyed in riot-stricken area named presence of National Guard troops as one major
reason rioting stopped).
317. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757-58 (1982).
318. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
319. One force used in civilian support operations, the United States Coast Guard, is a part
of the Department of Transportation in time of peace. 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). It does, however,
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1. The National Guard under state control
When operating under state control, National Guard soldiers are
subject to state laws governing immunity.3 20 Some states grant general
civil immunity to soldiers for acts performed in the line of duty. 2 ' For
example, in Krause v. Rhodes322 the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio pro-
vided absolute civil immunity for actions taken by National Guard
troops in the line of duty.323 It further found immunity for officers of the
National Guard for the actions of the troops under them based on the
theory that soldiers are servants not of the officers but of the state it-
self.324 The Supreme Court, no doubt stunned by the tragic events at
Kent State, reversed the Sixth Circuit. However, it did acknowledge
finding that in a claim under 42 U.S.C § 198321 good faith obedience to
orders is a defense in an action against soldiers and junior officers.326
2. Liability of individual soldiers
In the past, the Supreme Court has granted military personnel act-
ing in their official capacity a degree of immunity comparable to other
officials. It held in Howard v. Lyons,327 a companion case to Barr v. Mat-
teo,328 that a Navy captain's defamation of the civilian plaintiff occurred
in the course of the captain's duties, therefore rendering the sailor im-
mune from suit.
329
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,330 however, the Court restricted the wide im-
munity granted in Barr. In Mitchell, the Attorney General of the United
States was sued for authorizing illegal wiretaps.33' The Court refused to
grant the Attorney General absolute immunity even though the case in-
volved an issue of national security.332 The Court followed its ruling in
perform extensive civilian support missions. See Healy, supra note 14. A discussion of these
missions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
320. See Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 443 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nor. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
321. See, e.g., CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 366, 392 (Deering 1985). California also pro-
vides for indemnification of soldiers for acts taken while on duty. Id. § 393 (Deering 1985 &
Supp. 1992).
322. 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
323. Id. at 442.
324. Id. at 443.
325. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
326. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 250 (1974).
327. 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
328. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
329. Howard, 360 U.S. at 597-98.
330. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
331. Id. at 513-14.
332. Id. at 520.
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald,3 in which it held that when a "clearly estab-
lished" right334 is violated by an executive official, the privilege of immu-
nity does not apply.335 Thus, if soldiers, as members of the executive
branch, violate a "clearly established" right, the soldiers may be person-
ally liable.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied limited immunity in a
case involving the military in Tigue v. Swaim. 3 6 The plaintiff was an Air
Force captain who sued a military doctor for libel and false imprison-
ment in response to being removed from his job and involuntarily com-
mitted to a psychiatric ward.33 7 The defendant was granted an absolute
privilege from suit because of the special importance of her job: deter-
mining whether personnel, such as the plaintiff, were suitable for contin-
ued work with nuclear weapons.3 8 The court of appeals noted, however,
that there was no automatic immunity for military personnel performing
their duties during peacetime.33 9
The Third Circuit, in Martinez v. Schrock,34° found that a military
doctor was immune from malpractice liability for acts performed while
on duty.34 1 The court found the military doctor immune from suit for
three reasons.3 42 First, the surgeon was not acting by choice in selecting
the patient or the circumstances of the operation, and therefore holding
the doctor liable was unfair.343 Second, the plaintiff might have had a
claim against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 4.3 ' Finally, holding military doctors personally liable would hinder
recruiting and effective operations, especially in light of the limited sala-
ries of military personnel.345
The rationale of the Martinez court also applies to troops called to
duty within the United States. Like the doctor, they are not able to
333. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
334. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "Clearly established" rights are
those "statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id.
For a discussion of the factors relevant to determining whether a right is clearly established,
see 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES AND FEES § 9.20 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
335. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
336. 585 F.2d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 1978).
337. Id. at 911-12.
338. Id. at 914-15.
339. Id. at 913-14.
340. 537 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920 (1977).
341. Id. at 766.
342. Id. at 766-69.
343. Id. at 767.
344. Id. at 767-68; see supra part IV.A.
345. Martinez, 537 F.2d at 768-69.
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choose their task, nor can they follow a plan they created.346 Second, the
Federal Tort Claims Act could sometimes give injured parties relief.
347
Finally, and most importantly, imposing personal liability could hurt
military morale and preparedness because, with their limited resources,
the threat of suit would be a major concern to military personnel.34 8
Still, the question of immunity for military personnel remains unsettled.
Both Tigue3 4 9 and Martine 350 concerned common-law torts, and
while neither court had difficulty in concluding that military personnel
should be immune from suit, the Tigue court noted that it might have
ruled differently had the claim been based on a constitutional viola-
tion.3 1  The limits the Supreme Court placed on the immunity of gov-
ernment officials in Harlow v. Fitzgerald352 and Mitchell v. Forsyth,3 as
well as the hasty retreat from its strong stand in Gilligan v. Morgan,3
could signal that the Court will allow suit against soldiers on the street
for claims resulting from the use of deadly force. If so, it would only
confirm the worst fears of the troops.
During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the 40th Infantry Division of the
California Army National Guard distributed a set of instructions entitled
"Special Orders for Civil Disturbance Operations" to each soldier. 5
The document noted that the right to self-defense is "a right under the
law,"' 356 and that "the limitations [contained in the orders] are not in-
tended to infringe on this right. ' 35 7 While such statements would seem
to grant the individual soldier wide discretion to determine the actions
appropriate to a given situation, the special orders also stated detailed
descriptions of when and how deadly force may be used. 358 These state-
ments seem contradictory and confusing to soldiers unfamiliar with the
finer points of the law.359 This left some soldiers with an uneasy feeling
346. See supra part III.C.4.c.
347. See supra part IV.A.
348. Martinez, 537 F.2d at 769.
349. Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978).
350. Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920 (1977).
351. Tigue, 585 F.2d at 912.
352. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
353. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
354. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
355. See 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), California Army National Guard, Special
Orders for Civil Disturbance Operations (May 2, 1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See supra part III.C.
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and, in their minds, the grim choice of being judged by twelve jurors or
carried by six pallbearers.
The troops' concerns are not misplaced, for on March 4, 1993,
Marine Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde faced an Article 32360 hearing to
determine whether he should face court martial for wounding a young
Somali in Mogadishu during the civilian support mission in that na-
tion.361 Gunnery Sergeant Conde was in the passenger seat of his
Humvee when he was suddenly accosted through a window by an un-
known assailant.362 The Marine reacted, firing his weapon. 363 Fortu-
nately for the Somali, who had been attempting to steal Gunnery
Sergeant Conde's glasses, the wounds were not fatal.
36
Operation Restore Hope had been billed as a "humanitarian mis-
sion," but two Marines had already been killed by Somali gunmen by the
time of the February 2, 1993, incident.365 Gunnery Sergeant Conde's
own commanding officer had been shot and badly wounded on a supply
mission only two weeks earlier.3 66 The memory weighed heavily on the
minds of the troops in the unit.36 7
"Gunnery Sergeant Conde had to make a decision [in what] he
thought a life-threatening [situation] and he decided to pull the trig-
ger .... You cannot ask someone to second-guess the judgement [that
Gunnery Sergeant Conde] made. This is not the thing we bring Marines
to court for," said the defendant's military attorney in her summation.368
She went on to describe the case as a test of the military's rules of
engagement.369
The troops in Somalia closely watched the case.370 "You just can't
imagine what it's like out there," said one Marine to a reporter.37' Inci-
dents of violence against Americans grew more common as the operation
continued.372 The Marine rules of engagement would seem to reflect that
360. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988) (U.C.M.J. art. 32).
361. Mark Fineman, Use of Force at Issue in a Land ofAnarchy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993,
at A12.
362. Id.
363. Id
364. Mark Fineman, Marine Offers Chilling Testimony in Shooting of Somali, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1993, at A5.
365. See Fineman, supra note 361.
366. Id
367. Id at A13.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See Fineman, supra note 364.
371. See Fineman, supra note 361.
372. Id.
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brutal reality, stating: "Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your
right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.
'373
The situation in Somalia highlights the perils to both the soldiers
and the civilians of using military forces to perform the basic law en-
forcement functions. Soldiers are forced to make split-second decisions
in potentially life-threatening situations.374 Gunnery Sergeant Conde
knew someone was attacking him and chose to fire.375 A young man was
shot, and the Marine's decision was then examined in a judicial proceed-
ing that could lead to his imprisonment. 376 The liability of those who put
Gunnery Sergeant Conde and the boy on a collision course, the civilian
political leadership of the United States, remains unexamined.
V. CONCLUSION
The rules of the civilian world are utterly inappropriate in the sol-
dier's world, and the judicial system is not prepared for the regular do-
mestic use of the military. However, some government officials still
consider the military the key to solving many of the nation's problems.
37
The recent push to inject the military into the civilian arena reflects the
American tendency to regard history as "bunk. 3 7 The British knew
well the danger, and much of English history is the story of struggles
against the oppressive use of military power by tyrants. 379 The Founders
likewise knew the danger, and took pains to assuage the fears of the peo-
ple that their new nation's military might someday be used against
them.
380
Sadly, this traditional skepticism seems to have been lost, and re-
placed with a utilitarian, "pragmatic" view of a huge military establish-
ment now seemingly without a real mission.3"' Combined with a revived
respect for the military's efficiency and strength following the Gulf
War,382 the sight of a largely inert military establishment fuels the grow-
ing perception that letting the military solve social problems is quite
reasonable.383
373. Id. at A13.
374. See Fineman, supra note 364.
375. Id.
376. See Fineman, supra note 361.
377. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
378. "History is more or less bunk." Henry Ford, quoted in JOHN BARTLETt'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 587 n.2 (15th ed. 1980).
379. See Engdahl, supra note 20, at 2-18.
380. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, supra note 51, at 183.
381. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
382. See Ferraro, supra note 15.
383. See sources cited supra note 14.
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The military's ability to provide rapid solutions is a powerful new
tool to politicians accustomed to intractable problems.3 4 A number of
executives have tried to use that power in the past.385 In April 1992,
troops turned riot-torn Los Angeles into a calm, quiet city in less than
two days. Today, the politicians and commentators who want to apply
military efficiency to other problems fail to understand the dangers the
Founders had seen firsthand.38 6 By failing to learn from the past, they
may repeat history.38 7
The military view clashes with the notion of individual autonomy
that guides civilian law. Military efficiency is based on the subordination
of individual autonomy to the purpose of the organization.388 Immedi-
ately following the riots, Los Angeles was virtually crime free, but there
was a price: Troops with automatic weapons set up road blocks, pa-
trolled the streets and detained people found outside in violation of the
curfew imposed by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley.38 9
As the trend toward assigning internal missions to the military con-
tinues, the clash between military necessity and civilian concepts of jus-
tice will become more pronounced. The Supreme Court stated in
Gilligan v. Morgan 391 that there is no judicial role in the continuing over-
sight of military forces.391 While Scheuer v. Rhodes3 92 clarifies this hold-
ing,393 the judiciary is relegated to examining the military's actions only
after disaster strikes.
The legal system is unprepared to confront the widespread use of
military forces in civilian society. Political leaders are largely immune
from judicial challenge.394 The soldiers are suspicious of just how much
criminal and civil immunity they truly have,3 95 as they should be, for the
issue of the personal liability of the troops remains unsettled.396 The web
of judicial and statutory immunities makes it difficult for the civilian pop-
384. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
385. See supra part lI.C.
386. See supra part II.A.
387. See supra part II.A.
388. The courts have recognized that the military differs from the rest of society in that the
rights and privileges of its members may be infringed if required by military necessity. See
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986).
389. See Seigle, supra note 3.
390. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
391. Id. at 11-12.
392. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
393. Id. at 249-50.
394. See supra part IV.B.
395. See supra parts III.B.4, IV.B.
396. See supra part IV.C.2.
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ulation to obtain judicial relief when military force causes injury. 39 7 It is
the worst of both worlds.
The military and the civilian leadership need the protection of these
immunities to function in their respective capacities, yet these immunities
conversely leave the citizenry largely unprotected from abuses and inju-
ries. For that reason, most approaches to integrating military forces into
a greater civilian support role are bound to fail. Merely giving military
forces civilian police training eliminates the advantages that make using
troops attractive in the first place. The troops become merely police of-
ficers in camouflage fatigues. Conversely, using police in a paramilitary
role turns them into soldiers. 98
Alternatively, the courts may choose the civilian model and strictly
assign responsibility for tragic decisions, minimizing the qualified immu-
nity for executive functions. However, in such a situation the military
asset of efficiency is lost precisely because it restrains officials. The
Supreme Court tried to find middle ground in Scheuer, acting in the af-
termath of a shocking tragedy to limit the use of the military by state
officials. However, by restricting the actions of the military commander,
the Court rendered the military a nonmilitary force, that is, police of-
ficers in all but name. If a situation requires only peace officers, there is
no reason to involve the military. Except in the most dire of emergen-
cies, such as a full-scale insurrection, the military has no business on the
streets of America's cities.
In the military realm, success is paid for in lives. Casualties are a
part of the calculus. On foreign battlefields, the American military has
earned the respect of friend and foe. Yet the military's ability to project
decisive power is absolutely unacceptable for use at home no matter how
great the temptation. Today, some who have forgotten the teachings of
our history feel that using the military internally is merely common-sense
pragmatism in a time when the nation must maximize the return on
every dollar. It is not worth the risk.
Kurt Andrew Schlichter*
397. See supra part IV.
398. See Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975).
Such was the case at Jackson State, where heavily armed police officers reacted to a sniper with
massive return fire, resulting in the deaths of two students. Id. at 1270-71.
* This Comment is dedicated to my family as well as to the soldiers who served with me
in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and on the streets of Los Angeles in 1992. The views expressed in
this Comment are my own and do not necessarily represent the official views of any organiza-
tion or institution.
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